Urban Puritano • August 15, 2023

We Distinguish? Biblicism, Boogeymen, and Bereans

We Distinguish? (Who Is We?)

Biblicism, Boogeymen, and Bereans



Introduction



Disputes among Christians on social media are funny…until they aren't. When things heat up, it's either someone's intelligence, integrity, or their orthodoxy being questioned. When things cool down, we are told to keep discussions focused on doctrines, not dudes. But a partisan spirit is difficult to avoid. I am of Paul. I am of Apollos. I am a Cephas. I am of Christ. The same thing can be seen in discussions of the needlessly frustrating topic of Biblicism. What is biblicism and why does it matter? I bet you're wondering whose side I'm on. Have you read my four part blog piece on biblical interpretation according to Calvinism? What are you waiting for?


As far as whose side I'm on in the biblicism debate, I like Tree Beard's answer: “I am not altogether on anybody's side because nobody is altogether on my side, if you understand me well.” I hope this pointed yet fair and friendly critique is understandable to all who hear the episode and read this transcript. Gird your loins as we scratch the surface on biblicism!


The topic of biblicism has flared up in recent years and shows no signs of riding off peacefully into the sunset. I have, for the most part, avoided participating in such debates and discussions online because they have been addressed by various authors, pastors, and laypeople ad nauseam. We are at the point where blogs, vlogs, and podcasts are frequently referencing biblicism as a foil to confessionalism and occasionally getting both wrong. Ironically, more heat than light is spent on biblicism, and discussing it is not always profitable. It may be a points game now. To the best of my recollection and ability to track some quarters of the biblicism discussion, a recent approach is being doubled down on. It favors assertion more than argument, pejoratives more than premises. It seems the pejoratives are the premises. The bottom line is that biblicism is the boogeyman.


In his recently released book, “The Reformation as Renewal”, Dr. Matthew Barrett noted the term biblicism’s first use as a pejorative without noting its employment by a Roman Catholic. (HT to @NamorPB on X, formerly Twitter). This omission is important due to the common Romanist apologetic against Sola Scriptura, which was from that point pejoratively labeled as biblicism. 


Does original use of a term, however, determine its future use for all people and for all time? After all, the term “Christian” was originally used by infidels to label believers and persecute them on the basis of wanting to imitate Christ. “Look at them, they are little Christs.” Early Christians, thankfully, had the holy moxie to embrace the term “Christian” as a badge of honor. And believers of all stripes, biblicist and confessionalist alike, have been known as Christians for two millennia. What infidels meant for evil, simple believers having learned from God's ironic work of redemption in Christ meant it for good.


What if some sincere believers, knowing its pejorative origin in Romanist apologetics against Sola Scriptura, want to embrace the label? Is the label inherently naive or worse, insidious? If so, it must be shown to be so. Not even frequent Roman Catholic use of the term in the same way necessarily determined future use for subsequent Protestants who modified it for their ends. 


History may count noses, but truth doesn't. Romanist apologists already reject and refute Sola Scriptura with the pejorative epithet “Biblicist” as being the mother of all heresies. Therefore, when contemporary confessionalists inveigh against the supposed dangers or ignorance of biblicism, it is not that impactful or scandalous. In fact, even some confessionalists embrace the term Biblicist under a certain understanding of it. To the chagrin of some academically oriented believers and their enthusiastic acolytes, these confessional biblicists consider it intellectually and devotionally virtuous. The absolute madmen!


Apparently, there may be versions of biblicism that are perfectly biblical and confessional, similarly to how there are versions of, let's say, determinism that are biblical and confessional despite protestations to the contrary. After all, there are versions of “tradition” quite consistent with Classical Protestantism, are there not? Rome may own the copyright on capital “T” Tradition, but not lowercase “t” tradition. What if some sincere believers, whether learned or unlearned, embrace the label biblicist as an intuitive and natural outflow of faith in the precious promises of God found in the Bible? What logical or biblical need is there to say that such people are narcissists? What about calling them obscurantists? 


Isaiah 66 says, “But on this one will I look on him who is poor and of contrite spirit, and who trembles at my word.” This trembling at God's word is, as another Matthew comments, “an habitual awe of God's majesty and purity, and an habitual dread of His justice and wrath. Such a heart is a living temple for God. He dwells there, and it is the place of His rest. It is like heaven and earth, His throne and His footstool” (Matthew Henry). So then trembling at God's word is tantamount to trembling at God himself. 



What would drive anyone pastorally, logically, biblically, to accuse someone of an “idolatry of the letter” of Holy Writ? What can that possibly mean when our Lord Jesus himself says the words that I spoke to you are Spirit and they are life? (John 6:63). The literal is the spiritual and vice versa when it comes to the Bible. Many decry biblicism as a principled construct inherently imposed on the Scriptures, but our Lord excludes bifurcation of the spiritual from the letter. Do theological teachers give due respect to our Lord's elevation of the Word of God? I fear for the ones who do not. 


The devil, however, is in the details of how to apply this in discussions of biblicism versus confessionalism. Who is more biblical, the non-confessional biblicist, the non-biblicist confessionalist, or the confessional biblicist? I know. Heads are exploding right now. But we must distinguish right? Easier said than done. 



Defining Biblicism



Recent opponents of biblicism have had varying degrees of success in offering definitions of what they oppose. Let me just mention a few that are offered up by opponents. Davenant Institute produced a video entitled, “Is Biblicism Bad?” in which Alistair Roberts defined biblicism as, “that elevation of the Bible to such a high level that it occludes other things that we need to take into account.” However, it must be noted that Dr. Roberts prefaced his definition with a recognition, unlike Matthew Barrett, of the Bebbington Quadrilateral description of Evangelicals, of which biblicism forms part. David Bebbington is a church historian who wrote, “Evangelicalism in Modern Britain.”(HT: to Daniel C, whose resources can be found at puritanreformed.net. He was a graduate of Westminster Seminary California.) 



Bebbington's fourfold classification of evangelicalism consisted of conversionism, activism, crucicentrism, and biblicism. Apparently, Bebbington identifies himself as an Evangelical. Presumably, biblicism, therefore, isn’t at all pejorative. It is simply descriptive of how Evangelicals express their ultimate theological commitment. So, if biblicism is indeed irrefutably demonstrated to be bad, this prompts the question: Does that make evangelicalism into a wobbly Jenga tower seconds away from collapse? Maybe it does if we accept a pejorative sense of biblicism. 


Back to Robert's definition. Is it even possible to elevate the Bible to an unacceptably high degree and level? In Psalm 138:2, David remarkably raises the biblicist stakes and would seem to ruin the cause of anti-biblicism, or at least of Robert's definition of biblicism. The psalmist and Holy Spirit state, “for you have magnified your word above all your name.” 


Christians are supposed to be the people of the book. Given God's own elevation of His Word, it would seem that pearl clutching about extra biblical things being occluded is purely academic. All believers should be elevating the Bible to a maximally high degree. Our problems don't ever seem to be a supposed idolatry of the letter, but the neglect of the letter or its supplanting. 


Now, a curious point is attempted to be made by Roberts when he adduces the Bible's silence on an issue to illustrate an ethical lacuna of God's Word. Quite perplexingly, Roberts states that the Bible is silent on…(checking notes) necrophilia. Immediately, we are confronted with the academic impulse to score points among acolytes who go off and parrot similar talking points and straying from their own definitions of biblicism. 


Doesn’t Genesis 1 and 2 have something to say about sex, marriage, and fruitfulness? And does the fullness of the meaning of marriage revealed in a New Testament have no implications for that sick practice they mentioned? Robert's definition of biblicism did not specify in what sense the elevation of the Bible will necessarily lead to the occlusion of, let's say, natural law or ethical issues such as the example of necrophilia. In fact, I find this whole approach to be a disingenuous downgrade, not worthy of serious discussion. In politics, if you're the first to mention Hitler, you lose. In Christian Ethics, if you claim the Bible underdetermines whether necrophilia is licit, you lose. Necrophilia can quite reasonably be addressed biblically and confessionally as a sinful practice by a thoroughly Reformed exposition of the moral law of God. Anything outside the purview of licit sexual practices is sinful, whether it is explicitly or implicitly found in Scripture. The biblical data does not underdetermine this and many other issues one might think the Bible is silent on. 


Moreover, biblical silence is not to be equated with not having an explicit verse directly addressing a particular issue. After all, even non-confessionalist Christians believe in the Trinity by good and necessary consequence (“necessarily contained”, if you prefer). 


Speaking of good and necessary consequence (or necessarily contained), the Sadducees on one occasion are recorded to have argued similarly to Alistair Roberts in Matthew 22:23-33. They try to score points against the Lord Jesus by asking him a conundrum situation about the resurrection. They were under the false impression that Jesus was an unsophisticated, ignorant, naive, and perhaps even insidious biblicist. 



Since the Sadducees judged that the Bible was silent on the afterlife and a future resurrection of the body, they offered a reductio ad absurdum. They offered this on the basis of their notion of special revelation’s silence on the matter of the resurrection. Whose wife will a woman be at the resurrection if her previous seven husbands were brothers and all died succinctly? The Lord Jesus draws out two valid conclusions from supposed biblical silence. In doing so, he combats biblical superficiality rather than silence. 


First, the purpose and function of marriage fulfills its design in this earthly life, and to assume marriage continues in the resurrection is wrong. Why assume that? Second, they didn't read scripture aright, since a central divine declaration would have established the truth of the resurrection. “I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” The Logos, Jesus, draws out the valid logical implication God is not the God of the dead but of the living. It would seem that the necessity of the resurrection is required by the present tense in God's declaration. Leave it to Jesus to offer them a biblicist bone in their kebab. So much for idolatry of the letter.


Another recent description of biblicism as negative is found in a Modern Reformation Magazine article by London Lyceum's very own Jordan Stefaniak. It is entitled, “Everything in Nature Speaks of God: Understanding Sola Scriptura Aright.” He describes it in the opening paragraphs of the article as “a disordered love” with inevitably “corrosive” effects for both faith and practice Descriptions, however, are easier than definitions. In fact, Stefaniak confesses (pun intended) that there are, “several ways Biblicism could be defined.” Parenthetically, this is the heart of the issue! 



Biblicism does not enjoy a standard definition as other terms like infralapsarian or supralapsarian do. And while the infra and the supra attached to the lapsarian objectively mean something, the same courtesy isn't afforded to biblicism. “Bibl” is sitting right there in the middle of the word! Why greet it with crossed arms? 


Stefaniak offers the following definition: “Scripture is authoritative for all concepts of God and any other theological locus such as morality, anthropology, etcetera. Therefore, theological commitments must emerge from Scripture alone and be consistent with Scripture. Intuition, creed, confession, tradition, or any other source is incompatible with the supremacy of the Scriptures.” He further adds that biblicism, thus defined, is “impossible” for it allows no extra biblical input for theological construction to faithfully maintain Scriptures supremacy and sufficiency. 


Now, apart from painting one's opponent into a corner in a dispute, one must make sure that the proper footwear is being worn to avoid being stained with paint oneself. The process of attempting to paint one's opponent into a corner can be something of a Pyrrhic victory. 


Stefaniac asserts that an insurmountable problem with Biblicism as he defines it, is that since it “is unfeasible to derive any theological concept from Scripture without a secondary means apart from Scripture,” then even “[T]heology cannot be done.” Stefaniak further spreads the proverbial paint as he pushes his biblicist opponent into the corner by asserting even “the basic reading of the text and forming an idea of it is itself external to Scripture. Therefore, no one can consistently adhere to biblicism, because biblicism itself is a theological concept derived rationally from Scripture, and is thus unacceptable as a theory by the grounds of its own premise. Moreover, such a vision of theology is inconsistent with Scripture’s own vision.”


Now, nobody is infallible. Despite good intentions, we can't always employ and display serious thinking for a serious church, as the London Lyceum's motto states. I believe Stefaniak's argument above is not as cogent or sound as imagined, at least from the perspective of a, let's say, confessional biblicist. 


Many critical observations can be made, but I want to focus certain details. To the best of my ability, Stefaniak's argument can be distilled in this way:


Premise 1. Biblicism maintains it is always feasible to derive theological concepts from Scripture alone without secondary means such as reason, creeds, or even the act of reading itself to form ideas.

Premise 2. It is unfeasible to derive any theological concepts from scripture alone without secondary means. 

Therefore, biblicism is self referentially incoherent since it cannot be feasibly maintained. 


I'm no logician, so although the form of this argument may seem valid to some observers more logically inclined, I cannot help but offer the following criticisms. Premise 1 is mixed between how Stefaniak defines biblicism and what he stated it entails. Part of what he explained is that the act of reading is a secondary means of knowing or acquiring knowledge that is itself not derived from scripture. But this entailment would not be granted by the biblicist, who can simply maintain that reading, like reason itself, is simply how God ordained image bearers come in contact with divine special revelation in textual form. 


For God to design and cause the verbal and plenary inspiration of Scripture was to fit it to our cognitive faculties like hands and gloves. In principle, the adequacy of human language has been wedded to our cognitive faculties sufficiently to the purpose God ordained it for. It is, therefore, not apparent, much less proven, that the act of reading is a mismatch for maintaining the feasibility of deriving theological concepts from Scripture alone.


Speaking of which, Premise 2 seems to suffer from a lack of modesty. It seemingly is in a hurry to reach that unpainted corner or conclusion, given that there is no reason to think, certainly no demonstrably good reason, provided that according to biblicism, either reason or reading makes it unfeasible to derive any theological concepts from scripture alone without secondary means, we only need to provide one example or instance of deriving a theological concept from scripture alone without a secondary means. Where should we look? To ask, that is to answer it!


If this hypothetical biblicist really existed, the stronger brother should imitate the Lord Jesus as He theologized offering counterexamples from Scripture. The problem is that Premise 2 is formulated from a supposed self-evident truth that it is unfeasible to derive any theological concepts from Scripture alone without secondary means. If I was ever to encounter a biblicist according to Stefaniak's definition, I won't make Stefaniak's assertion of Premise 2. Instead, I will offer a markedly Protestant, Evangelical, Confessional, and, dare I say, Biblicist answer. 


Romans 4:3 says, “For what does Scripture say? Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness.” Also, “…just as David also describes the blessedness of the man to whom God imputes righteousness apart from works. Blessed are those whose lawless deeds are forgiven.”


Romans 4, where Paul argues for justification by faith, results in refuting Stefaniak's premise 2. Why? Because the Apostle Paul derived the theological concept and conclusion of justification by faith alone from the Old Testament narrative in Genesis 15 and from the poem of Psalm 32. Makes one wonder if Paul was a Confessional Biblicist of sorts. 


Not only can this sort of theologizing be feasible, we must remember by whom it must be feasibly maintained. Paul's audience at the Church of Rome were not the sophisticated or philosophically inclined. They were merchants, the poor, the humble, the illiterate, and perhaps even slaves. The Scriptures may not have been able to be read individually by all, but certainly all heard the Scriptures being read collectively and publicly preached from. Don’t forget, “faith comes by hearing and hearing by the Word of God.” We all can feasibly theologize from Scripture alone. That's what Protestantism is famous for concerning justification, right? And the perspicuity of Scripture, right? Stefaniak’s Premise 2 postulates too much and seems to make Protestant Christianity itself self referentially incoherent. Thank God for Paul!


We'll look at one more definition of biblicism before we end this. It's from the Baptist Broadcast in a recent video entitled, “Is Biblicism Biblical?” Like the host and guest, some pastors and professors and young seminary and whippersnappers sometimes define biblicism as a rejection of things not explicitly stated in Scripture, with a concomitant rejection of creedal and confessional statements, even if produced by the church in the past. Whereas the previous descriptions and definitions may have been less on the nose with their synthesis of what constitutes biblicism, this definition isn't playing Footsie with anyone. It is no coincidence many Reformed Baptists use it, since they are by nature incapable of playing Footsie with anyone. 


It gives no quarter for anyone who might think they can be Confessional Biblicists: either principled Biblicism or principled Confessionalism. In atypical magnanimous Reformed Baptist fashion, however, there is a glimmer of mercy, but only a glimmer. If the principled biblicist is not insidious or seriously in error, than he is simply seriously naive in his biblicist principles. Someone like a theological Forrest Gump, perhaps. I ask, however, who and where are these biblicists? Reality seems to reflect that this boogeyman is made out to be a mountain instead of being recognized as the molehill that it really is. 


“No Creed but Christ!” may have been a slogan known to some of yesteryear from certain denominations, but nowadays I mainly hear it from certain academics and their acolytes who parrot prepackaged talking points. And as mentioned, the talking points don't even get the origin of the term right and its subsequent modifications. One such talking point, used as a slam dunk against not so much biblicism in the abstract, but personally against biblicists, goes like this: “The confession does not have ultimate authority, but it has more authority than you!” Not as artistic or effective as Tetzel’s slogan: “As soon as a coin in the coffers rings, the soul from purgatory springs.”


Can you imagine the inadequacy of that talking point to the naive sincere biblicist needing instruction? The inadequacy in that common Reformed Baptist talking point online isn’t in a lack of artistic imagination. If you know of any non-denominational, holiness, denomination, Assembly of God, Free Church, or other run-of-the-mill Baptist biblicist, wouldn't reasoning and reading scripture be more God honoring and fruitful? The sincere believer may be anti-confessional with Biblicist tendencies. He hears that quip and wonders why it's a slam dunk refutation of biblicism. Don't confessionalists, they may wonder, know about Paul and the Bereans? 


It's as though some Reformed Baptists don't remember being Pop-Arminians, themselves, and coming to accept the doctrines of grace through much struggle. Unfortunately, there are too many confessionalists who can't be bothered to respect the misguided believer operating under unbiblical assumptions, such as only holding onto explicit statements in Scripture. Boogeymen are offered more than the Berean way. 


A recent strategy among environmentalism activists is to claim “climate homicide.” They are charging oil companies for culpability in causing extreme weather events, rising sea levels, etc. But this charge is based on so called “Attribution Science,” which posits connections between one thing and another as cause and effect. At this point, some Reformed Baptists are unwittingly adopting this approach, a sort of attribution theology saying biblicism leads to Rome. That's what's happening in the Baptist Broadcast. I fear this is nothing more than an empty attempt to virtue signal one's own superior theology. What it lacks in virtue, it abounds in non sequiturness.



Conclusion



If at this point, dear reader, you are not closer to a definitive, agreed upon by all parties, standard technical definition of biblicism, that means that the parties involved are talking past each other. Biblicism is an equivocal boogeyman, but a boogeyman nonetheless. That is why I prefer Berean. It's Biblical and fits quite comfortably with my Confessional Calvinism. Test the spirits!


 We started by taking note of Matthew Barrett's documentation of the first use of biblicism as pejorative thanks to the detective work of Namor, Particular Baptist (@NamorPB on X, formerly Twitter). We learned it was from a Romanist author for whom biblicism can only ever be pejorative because it is the equivalent term to the Protestant Sola Scriptura. (Imprimatur by the Church? Was Barrett citation indicating approbation?).


But it never seems to dawn on those confessional Protestants advocating the pejorative use of biblicism that they had to change its original Roman Catholic definition of it as the equivalent to Sola Scriptura and use it in a lighter way. If they enjoy the privilege of redefining terms in their favor and for their use, why can't anyone else? Seems that chronological snobbery is a two way street. 


Confessional Calvinists with thick skin like myself yawn at being labeled a hyper-Calvinist by other Protestant or Evangelical traditions. Adding one more pejorative like biblicist doesn't make me no never mind. It's mind over matter : if I don't mind, it don't matter. “As long as we don't scream at each other because that's what it sounds like when doves cry.” (Prince).


 Next, we gave a Davenant Institute definition. It wasn't the worst. I had the virtue of being polite, but then Davenant got Deviant with the example of necrophilia. At least they acknowledge Bebbington's Quadrilateral, in which biblicism was used non-pejoratively. Thanks once again to Daniel C, graduate of Westminster Seminary in California. He can be found on X, as @puritanreformed, and once again on puritanreformed.net.


With tongue firmly planted in cheek, I say Bebbington may not have ultimate authority on Evangelical Church History, but he has more authority than Roman Catholic Finngan (originator of the term “Biblicism” as the pejorative equivalent of Sola Scriptura). Then we discussed Jordan Stefaniak's definition of a hard version of biblicism. I think I showed that a biblicist worth his salt can effectively avoid being painted into a corner, as well as simultaneously showing that Stefaniak cannot avoid being splashed and stained by paint himself. Lastly, we looked at a popular level Reformed Baptist strategy that just baldly states biblicism leads to Rome. But that's just attribution theology. No charges for Bible homicide can be filed. That's just as lazy as an upper jaw. 


The bottom line is, if the glove does not fit, you must acquit. 


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By Roberto Gazga August 9, 2026
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By Urban Puritano July 27, 2026
Patrick Schreiner has asked for something reasonable, and I want to grant it before I disagree with anything. In a recent excerpt at *Christianity Today*, drawn from his book *The Four Senses of Scripture*, he opens with the interpretation everyone loves to condemn: Augustine on the Good Samaritan. The man going down to Jericho is Adam. The thieves are the devil and his angels. The priest and the Levite are the old covenant ministry, which could profit nothing for salvation. The Samaritan is Christ. The inn is the church. The innkeeper is the Apostle Paul. Modern instructors, Schreiner observes, hold this up as a specimen of how not to read. He asks us to slow down. We ought not to reject such a reading, he says, if we refuse to enter the worldview and reading strategy that produced it. Understanding is not agreement, but we can at least understand why a man like Augustine read a parable this way. Granted. Entirely granted. Augustine was not a fool, he was not playing games, and the men who read the parable as he did — Origen before him, Aquinas after him — were serious men doing what they believed the text required. Anyone who cannot say that much has not earned the right to disagree. So let us enter the reading strategy, exactly as invited. And let us do it the way Schreiner himself proposes: not theoretically, but by going to the Scriptures. "The proof is in the pudding," he writes. I agree. So I want to take his own worked example and test it by his own stated rules. That is the whole of what follows. I am not going to argue that the fourfold sense is unhistorical, or that its practitioners were unspiritual, or that the men who used it loved Christ less than we do. I am going to ask whether the example given to demonstrate the method actually demonstrates it. Who speaks for the other side? First, though, a word about who is standing in the dock. When the essay turns to the position it means to correct, the man who appears is Benjamin Jowett. Scripture has one meaning, Jowett says: the meaning it had to the mind of the prophet or evangelist who first uttered or wrote it, and to the hearers or readers who first received it. The interpreter must not add another meaning but recover the original one. We are to read the Bible like any other book. That is a real position, and it is fairly quoted. But it is worth knowing whose position it is. Benjamin Jowett was Master of Balliol College (Oxford), and the essay in question comes from *Essays and Reviews*, published in 1860 — a volume so far from confessional orthodoxy that two of its contributors were prosecuted in the ecclesiastical courts. Jowett was not defending the single sense of Scripture as the Reformed churches confessed it. He was proposing that the Bible be handled like any other ancient book, which is precisely what the Reformed churches denied. So the reader is offered two options. He may have Jowett's single meaning according to the historical critical method, thin and historical and closed at the moment of first reception. Or he may have the fourfold house. Put that way, most Christians with any spiritual instinct will take the house, and they will be right to. But there is a third position, and it is the one the confessions actually hold. Here is the Westminster Confession, and the Second London Baptist Confession after it, at 1.9: "The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself: and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly." Read that carefully, because it is doing two things at once, and both matter. It says the sense of Scripture is one, not manifold. That is the denial of the quadriga, stated as plainly as a confession can state anything. But look at what it says in the same breath. The true and full sense. Searched out by other places that speak more clearly. Scripture interpreting Scripture, across the whole canon, under a divine Author who wrote all of it. That is not Jowett. Jowett's meaning is sealed inside the mind of the first writer and the ears of the first hearers. The confession's single sense reaches wherever the canon reaches, because one Author stands behind the whole of it. This is not a small difference. It is the difference between a text with one thin meaning and a text with one true and full meaning. And it is the position that never appears in the essay. I do not say this was done deliberately. I say it happened, and that it determines everything downstream. If the only alternative to four senses is Jowett, then four senses wins by default. The reader never meets the position the confessions actually took, so he is never given the chance to prefer it. The proof in the pudding Now to the example. Schreiner takes Matthew 23:37 — "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, the city that kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to it!" — and reads it four ways. Literally , Jerusalem is the historical city: taken from the Jebusites, made David's capital, later the capital of Judah, and now the city Jesus enters on his way to the cross. Allegorically , Jerusalem stands for all God's people who have killed the prophets, past, present, and future. He cites Galatians 4:25. Tropologically , Jerusalem represents the individual human soul. Christ's lament is personal. He longs for you and me to have our hearts opened to him. We should not be like historical Jerusalem, which sought to kill him. Anagogically , Jerusalem reminds us of the New Jerusalem, and Christ's cry looks forward to the day when his city will welcome him. He cites Galatians 4:26, Hebrews 12:22–23, and Revelation 21:2. Now look at the citations, because they are not distributed evenly. The allegorical reading has a verse. The anagogical reading has three. The tropological reading has none. Hold that, and consider what the cited verses are actually doing. Galatians 4 is Paul reading Jerusalem in two registers. Hebrews 12 is the writer setting Mount Zion and the heavenly Jerusalem before the church. Revelation 21 is John seeing the city come down. In every case the connection between Jerusalem and the thing Jerusalem is said to mean is made by Scripture itself. That is not a second sense laid over the text. That is the confession's own rule: the true and full sense of one place searched out by other places that speak more clearly. When Schreiner reads Matthew 23 in light of Galatians 4, he is not doing something the single sense forbids. He is doing the very thing the single sense requires. I would read it the same way, and so would every Reformed commentator I know. Which leaves the tropological. Here there is no verse, because there is no verse to give. No apostle tells us that Jerusalem signifies the individual soul. The claim arrives on its own authority. And notice what follows it: Christ's lament is personal; he longs for our hearts to be opened; we should not be like the city that killed him. Every word of that is true. Every word of it is preachable. But not one word of it is a second sense. It is application — the pressing of the one meaning upon the conscience of the hearer. Preachers have done it from the single sense since the apostles, and no one needed a fourth tier to do it. If Jerusalem's killing of the prophets means what it plainly means, then a man who reads it and does not tremble has misread it. That is not a further sense of the text. That is the text landing where texts are meant to land. So the example divides cleanly. Where the reading is warranted, it is warranted by the canon — and the canon read whole is the single sense, not an alternative to it. Where the reading is genuinely distinct from the literal sense, no warrant is offered at all. The same pattern holds in his second example. The Psalms, he says, are Israel's songs literally, Christ's songs allegorically, our songs tropologically, and new-creation songs anagogically. The anagogical reading gets citations: Revelation 5:13, Psalm 145:21, Psalm 150:6. The tropological gets a sentence about the new covenant and no text. Twice now, in the two examples chosen to display the method, the moral sense arrives without a verse. I want to be careful here. I am not saying Schreiner has no verses in his book; I have not read every page of it, and an excerpt is an excerpt. I am saying something narrower and, I think, harder to wave off. These are the examples he selected to show the method working. If the demonstration cannot supply canonical warrant for one of its four senses in either instance, the reader is entitled to ask what is holding that sense. A house, or a seed? The essay's governing image is a house. The literal sense is the foundation, the allegorical the walls, the tropological the furniture, the anagogical the roof. It is a beautiful image, and it is very old. It is also, precisely, an image of addition. A foundation does not become walls. Furniture is carried in from outside and set on a floor that was finished without it. Four materially distinct things are assembled into one structure, and the structure is only complete when all four are present. Which is why the essay must say what it says next: you cannot read rightly without attending to the christological sense, or the moral sense, or the eschatological sense. Without these, the house is not yet constructed. There it is — the load-bearing claim of the whole enterprise. Not that the fourfold sense is edifying, or ancient, or reverent, but that the literal sense by itself is not enough. A foundation with no walls is not a house. It is a slab. And here the essayist is caught by his own hand, for elsewhere he concedes what this claim cannot survive. In a public disputation he grants: “Every text has a literal sense. Not every text has a spiritual sense” (Kenwood Institute disputation, youtu.be/eJx1i7Mb6a0 ). Set that beside the house. If some texts have no spiritual sense, then for those texts the house is finished at the foundation — complete, habitable, whole, with no walls, no furniture, and no roof. The slab, it turns out, is sometimes the whole building. But a foundation that is already a finished house for one text cannot be a mere slab for the next, unless some rule tells us which texts get the upper storeys and which do not — and no such rule is offered. He has conceded the sufficiency of the single sense for an unnamed number of passages, while giving no reason the same sufficiency should not extend to the rest. Notice the irony. The whole case against the single sense is that it is Jowett’s — thin, flat, the bare letter and nothing more. Yet the texts he grants a literal sense only, he does not treat as thin; he treats them as sufficient. Which is precisely the confession’s claim, and never Jowett’s: one sense, and full. The retrieval has been fighting the thin single sense so hard it never noticed the thick one standing beside it — the one it half-holds itself. But then, in nearly the same breath, the essay says something that pulls hard the other way. The other senses must find their grounding in the literal, or they will collapse. Allegory must grow from the literal. Grow . That is a seed, not a scaffold. And the two images cannot both be true. If the further senses grow out of the literal the way a stalk grows out of a seed, then they were in the seed, and what we have is one thing unfolding — which is exactly what the single sense claims. If they are walls set upon a foundation, then they came from somewhere else, and the mason brought them. You may have organic growth or you may have construction. You may not have both, and the argument needs both: growth to escape the charge of adding to Scripture, construction to justify the number four. There is a third phrase, quieter than the others, where the whole issue is compressed into a single verb. The literal sense, we are told, contains, discloses, but also veils the mystery of Christ. Contains and discloses I can affirm without hesitation. But veils is doing an enormous amount of work. If the letter veils, then something else must unveil, and a second sense becomes necessary by definition — not because it was shown to be necessary, but because the literal sense was described in a way that guarantees it. The conclusion is loaded into the premise. Change one verb and the argument for a second sense evaporates. One more feature of the house deserves naming, because the essay leans on it. The four senses are presented in what it calls a “Protestant order” — the literal first, the foundation from which the others must grow, on pain of finding Christ where he should not be found and drifting into heresy. The instinct is right: sever allegory from the letter and you get chaos. But notice what the safeguard costs. If the upper senses must grow from the literal, organically, or else collapse, then they are the literal unfolding — one sense reaching its full measure — not a second sense resting on a first. The tighter the essay binds the spiritual senses to the literal to keep them safe, the less they look like distinct senses at all. And whatever this reordering is, it is not the Protestant doctrine of Scripture’s sense. Reordering the quadriga’s four is not the same as holding what the Reformed churches confessed — that the sense is not four in any order, but one. Where the four came from One more question, and it is the one I cannot get past. Why four? The essay is candid, and I respect the candor. Christian interpreters began distinguishing senses early, it says, though the four were not solidified until later. John Cassian, who died around 435, named the four in his *Conferences*. Before that, the evidence offered is the *Epistle of Barnabas*, which says Moses spoke spiritually. But "spiritually" is not a number. It is not even a claim about how many senses a text has. It is a word that says: do not read this woodenly. Tyndale would have said the same. So would Calvin. So would any confessional Protestant who has ever preached from Leviticus. So the pedigree divides. The antiquity belongs to reading spiritually, which nobody in this argument denies. The number four is fifth-century and later, which the essay itself concedes. And where does the number come from? The essay tells us, in a line from Bonaventure that is quoted for other reasons. By tropology we are taught how to act; by allegory, what to believe with faith; by anagogy, what to desire for our eternal delight. Believe, act, desire. Faith, love, hope. The three spiritual senses are the three theological virtues. The correspondence is not an accident and it was never hidden; it is the traditional mapping, and it is elegant. But notice what it means. The number of senses is fixed by a schema of the Christian life, not derived from any feature of any text. Nothing in Matthew 23 tells you to expect three spiritual senses rather than two or five. The count arrives from outside and is applied. That is worth sitting with. When we ask the quadriga why there are four senses, the honest answer is not exegetical. It is that a beautiful and coherent account of the soul's life happened to have three parts, and a foundation was laid beneath them. One last thing about senses There is a technical moment in the essay that I suspect will pass most readers by, but it deserves a paragraph. Schreiner introduces a distinction to explain what the fathers meant. Sense, he says, refers to what someone says, while reference refers to what that something is about. Good. That is a real and useful distinction, and it is the right tool. Then comes the application: the four senses affirm that there can be four different, though connected, referents. But by the definition just given, four referents are not four senses. They are one thing said, about which several things are true — or toward which several things point. And the confession does not deny that Scripture has many referents. It denies that Scripture has many senses. "Not manifold, but one" is a claim about what the text says, not about how many realities the saying touches. If what the retrieval actually wants is that Christ, the church, the soul, and the age to come are all bound up in what Matthew 23:37 is about, then I do not think any confessional Protestant needs to object, and the label "four senses" is a misnomer for it. If the retrieval wants four things said, then it needs to show that from a text, and the Jerusalem example did not. What I am not saying I am not saying the impulse behind this book is wrong. It is not. Schreiner is right that much modern interpretation is thin, that Christ is genuinely everywhere in the Scriptures, that the text is meant to be lived and not merely studied, and that our reading ought to end in hope. If the choice were between the fourfold sense and a Bible flattened into an ancient history lecture manuscript, I would probably take the fourfold sense without blinking. This might be the quadriga's appeal to some Reformed preachers to inject their preaching with rhetorical inspiration for their homiletical inertia. But I digress. But that is not the choice, and I think the essay's structure obscures the fact. Notice how it begins and how it ends. It begins with Augustine's Samaritan — the hardest case, the one everybody condemns — and asks us not to dismiss it too quickly. It ends by calling the fourfold sense faithful , helpful , historic , and holistic , a hermeneutical house we can live in. Between those two points, the Samaritan is never adjudicated. We are never told whether the innkeeper is Paul. We are told that Augustine had reasons, that his method was widely shared, and that the method is good. But the question the essay raised in its first paragraph is left where it was found. And it is a fair question to press, because the method has to answer it. Is the innkeeper Paul? If yes, on what grounds? If no, on what grounds? A reader who wants to say no needs a rule that the method can supply, and I cannot find one in the essay that would do it — nothing except the judgment of other readers, which is not a rule about the text at all. That is what four adjectives cannot fix. Faithful says the reading is permitted. Helpful says it is useful. Historic says it is old. Holistic says it is comprehensive. Every one of those may be granted, and not one of them shows that the single sense of Scripture is insufficient. Yet insufficiency is the claim the whole house rests on: without these, the house is not yet constructed. Show me that. Not that a fourfold reading is edifying — I will stipulate that it often is. Show me a text whose meaning cannot be had unless a second sense is added to it, and show me the rule that tells us when to add one and when to stop. The charity that ran dry Return, at the end, to where the essay began. It opened by asking us not to dismiss Augustine’s Samaritan too quickly — to enter the reading before rejecting it. It was a fair request, and I have tried to honor it throughout. But notice where the charity was spent, and where it ran dry. Every hospitality was extended to a fourth-century allegory the church has almost entirely set aside. None was extended to the position the Reformed confessions actually hold — that the sense of Scripture is not manifold, but one. That position was not entered and answered. It was not named. So I will ask for the same charity the essay asked for Augustine, and ask it for the confession instead. Before we are invited to give a reordered quadriga a hearing — an order the Reformed confessions never taught — the single sense those confessions did teach might be given the hearing it never received here. Enter that worldview first. Until then, I will keep the confession's answer, and I do not think it is the thin thing the essay's alternative makes it out to be. The sense of Scripture is one. It is also full — searched out by other places that speak more clearly, spanning a canon written by one Author who knew the end from the beginning, pressing on the conscience of every man who reads it, and opening onto the city that is to come. That is not a slab. That is already a house, and Christ laid it. Responding to Patrick Schreiner, "How to Read the Bible Like the Early Church Did," Christianity Today (July 2026), excerpted from* The Four Senses of Scripture: Learning from Ancient Ways of Reading the Bible *(Baker Academic, 2026). Be sure to keep an eye out for my forthcoming book on the single sense of Scripture as Biblical, rational, and confessional. 

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